In 2005, the U.S. Bankruptcy Law suffered major adjustments with the passing of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). In this paper, I explore the market pricing implications of this change. There is evidence that, in the pre-bankruptcy period, the risk-adjusted stock price performance is very similar whether the case is initiated under the BAPCPA or its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The market reaction to the formal announcement of bankruptcy becomes clearly stronger after the enactment of the BAPCPA. My results highlight the interaction between regulation and market behavior and have important consequences for both investors and managers, as discussed in the paper.
Introduction
A central tenet in economics is that competition among companies drives markets towards a state of long-run equilibrium in which goods are produced at minimal marginal cost. In the transition to such equilibrium, inefficient firms are forced out of the market (White, 1989) . Modern societies deal with corporate failure by developing and implementing complex bankruptcy laws. A simple principle governs such laws: reorganization of the business is to be allowed if the firm's intrinsic value exceeds its liquidation value (Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005, pp. 8) . The particulars of the bankruptcy code, however, differ widely across countries. For instance, Germany and the U.K. are known for having "tough" bankruptcy laws which grant considerable protection to creditors and favor the retrieval of secured loans over the survival of the business (e.g., Frank, Nyborg and Touros, 1996; White, 1996) . In contrast, the U.S. bankruptcy code is typically considered to be "soft" since it provides significant latitude to debtors during the bankruptcy proceedings (e.g., Kausar, Taffler and Tan, 2008; Fisher and Martel, 2008; Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian and Thorburn, 2008) . Interestingly, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) in October 2005 seems to have shifted the general perception about the U.S. bankruptcy code. In effect, many scholars argue that the new code greatly restricts the protection offered to debtors and substantially reduces the likelihood of a successful reorganization (e.g., Altman and Hotchkiss, 2005, pp. 47-55; Ayotte and Morrison, 2009; Gilson, 2010, pp. 82-83) . 1 This paper shows how the introduction of the BAPCPA changed the market's perception about corporate failure. First, the pre-bankruptcy risk-adjusted stock price performance is shown to be very similar whether firms seek the protection of the Bankruptcy Court under the BAPCPA or under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Second, is observed an asymmetric market reaction to the announcement of bankruptcy conditional on the Bankruptcy Code that will govern the proceedings. When the case is initiated after October 2005, the mean abnormal return for the three-day window centered on the bankruptcy announcement date ranges from -49.1% to -46.5% depending on the riskadjustment technique; the equivalent pre-BAPCPA interval is -28.2% to -26.7%. Third, the post-event loss in shareholder value is much more significant after the passing of the BAPCPA. Firms filing under the new bankruptcy law lose, on average, a further 13.3% of their value on a risk-adjusted basis over the two 1 See also Gottlied, L., 2008, "The Disappearance of Retail Reorganization In The Post-BAPCPA Era", testimony before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, accessed on 09/10/210 at http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/uploads/file/Gottlieb080926.pdf . week period following the bankruptcy announcement date; the parallel figure for pre-BAPCPA cases is not statistically significant at meaningful levels.
Results are interesting for several reasons. First, simply because corporate bankruptcy matters. The aftermath of Lehman Brothers' failure in 2008 show how one single bankruptcy case can have striking and world-reaching effects. Unfortunately, Lehman Brothers is just the tip of the iceberg: the ten largest bankruptcies ever in the U.S. occurred after 2000 and involved an astonishing cumulative asset value in excess of $1,529 billion.
2 Clearly, bankruptcy, once an obscure event affecting only the smallest companies has become an important concern for virtually all firms and investors. This study is also important because it is the first paper to examine how the market deals with the announcement of bankruptcy after the enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Act. Previous papers have explored parallel issues but focus exclusively on pre-BAPCPA periods (e.g., Aharony, Jones and Swary, 1980; Clark and Weinstein, 1983; Morse and Shaw, 1988; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 1995; Dawkins, Bhattacharya and Bamber, 2007; Coelho, Taffler and John, 2010) . The paper shows that filing for bankruptcy continues to be an important public event that provides critical information about the future prospects of the firm. In addition, this study sheds further light on the interaction between regulation and market behavior. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) were among the first to discuss the importance of legal regimes in explaining the differences in how financial markets operate across countries. Despite all the research that followed this seminal contribution, we still lack a thorough understanding on how investors respond to changes in particular laws, a gap that this study addresses.
My results also have practical implications for corporate managers, especially those who are keen to using Chapter 11 in non-traditional ways. Strategic bankruptcies, for instance, are cases where firms seek the protection granted by the Federal Bankruptcy Court, not because of a financial/economic problem but rather as a planned business strategy, designed to maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of another stakeholder group (Delaney, 1998; Rose-Green and Dawkins, 2002; and Coelho and Taffler, 2010) . Moreover, managers seem to use Chapter 11 more often than one might theoretically expect. In effect, Altman, Kant and Rattanaruengyot (2009) find that between 1984 and 2009, 212 publicly traded firms filed for Chapter 11 at least twice and 9 firms actually filed for Chapter 11 three times. The dramatic effects of the enactment of the BAPCPA on shareholder value documented in this paper should help such corporate managers to reassess the merits of using Chapter 11 as a simple management tool. Every-day investors can also benefit from my findings. Coelho et al (2010) show that a certain clientele of retail investors is keen on trading the stock of bankrupt firms. Savvy investors should now recognize that the potential return from such high-risk trading strategy has become significantly lower after the enactment of the BAPCPA.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly presents some of the related literature and my key research hypothesis. Section 3 summarizes the data and sections 4 and 5 present the methodology and results, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Law and the changes introduced by the BAPCPA
The term bankruptcy comes from the Italian for broken bench, "banca rotta". Under Roman law, dating back to 118 B.C., the entire estate of a debtor was sold in one lump sale to a single buyer, who would then pay creditors a percentage of what was owed. The debtor continued to be responsible for any remaining debt and failure to repay it in a fairly quick order would dictate one of four possible fates: imprisonment, enslavement, exile or even death (Delaney, 1998, p. 12) .
In the U.S., early Federal laws concerning bankruptcy were temporary responses to bad economic conditions. In effect, the first official bankruptcy law in that country was enacted in 1800 in response to land speculation, being repealed three years later. The second bankruptcy law was passed in 1841 as a response to the panic of 1837 and lasted only until 1843. The economic turmoil of the American Civil War caused Congress to pass another bankruptcy law in 1867, which was revoked in 1878. These initial experiences shared a common characteristic: to some extent, they allowed the discharge of unpaid debts, a major innovation when compared to the ancient Roman law. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 continued this legal tradition by introducing the concept of "equity receivership", which explicitly allowed firms in distress to protect themselves from creditors. During the thorny years of the Great Depression the provisions for business' reorganization were made extensive by three consecutive Bankruptcy Acts: the Bankruptcy Act of 1933, the Bankruptcy Act of 1934 and the Chandler Act of 1938.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed in 1978 and took effect on October 1, 1979. This act substantially renovated bankruptcy practices, making it easier for both businesses and individuals to file for bankruptcy and reorganize. The old Chapters X, XI and XII were consolidated into a single Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 was introduced for the first time. Under Chapter 7, a trustee was appointed to oversee the orderly liquidation of the firm's assets. Most of the large companies, however, usually chose to file for Chapter 11, which was designed to facilitate corporate reorganization. To this end, Chapter 11 guaranteed an automatic stay on all outstanding debts and granted incumbent management 120 days of exclusivity to submit a reorganization plan. The reorganization plan could call for substantial consolidation of pre-petition liabilities, cancellation of old equity, conversion of old debt into equity or infusion of new equity.
The last major change to the U.S. bankruptcy law occurred in 2005, with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) by the U.S. Congress. While many of the changes were targeted at consumer bankruptcies, the amendments also significantly affected creditors' rights in Chapter 11 business reorganizations and Chapter 7 business liquidations. Table 1 summarizes some of these changes.
3 As can be seen, the new code explicitly limits the period given to the incumbent management for presenting and approving a reorganization plan. With the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, managers had 120 days to accomplish the same goal but bankruptcy judges would usually grant multiple extensions to such deadline. As a result, managers could effectively maintain control over the bankrupt firm for many years. Currently, however, managers' exclusivity period ends 18 months after the commencement of the case and no extensions are allowed.
Vendors' "reclamation rights" were also substantially altered with the introduction of the BAPCPA. As shown in table 1, under the old law, vendors had 20 days to reclaim the merchandise shipped on credit to customers undergoing Chapter 11 reorganization. Now, Section 546(c) of the bankruptcy code specifies that vendors can reclaim their merchandise up to 45 days after shipment. In addition, vendors who do not exercise their reclamation rights have an administrative priority claim for merchandise shipped to a company that files for Chapter 11, if merchandise is delivered within 20 days before the bankruptcy date.
The BAPCPA has also changed the relationship between debtors and utility firms. As can be seen in table 1, according to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, utilities were required to provide services to firms in Chapter 11 as long as the debtor could provide "adequate assurance" of future payment. "Adequate assurance" was assessed by taking into account the bankrupt firm's payment history and existing financial projections. The previous law did not require debtors to make any deposit or post collateral to secure a continuous supply of services by the utility companies. In sharp contrast, the BAPCPA now states that firms in Chapter 11 must provide "adequate assurance of payment" within 30 days of filing for bankruptcy, and that such assurance must be in the form of a cash deposit, letter of credit, prepayment, or surety bond.
Another key change introduced by the new bankruptcy code relates to the leases of commercial property. Previously, debtors were granted a 60-day period to decide on whether or not to assume a lease. Yet, courts could repeatedly extend this deadline and, in practice, debtors were often able to defer the lease assumption/rejection decision until the plan's confirmation date. As shown in table 1, under the BAPCPA, firms have 120 days to assume or reject any given lease and, without the landlord's written consent, the judge can only grant a 90-days extension to such a deadline. Moreover, prior to assuming any lease while operating under Chapter 11, the debtor must cure any pre-existing defaults, and demonstrate that it can adequately perform under the lease in the future. Finally, if a bankrupt firm does not assume the lease by the end of 120+90 days period, it is assumed to be rejected and the debtor must immediately vacate the property. Table 1 shows that the BAPCPA has also made it more difficult for debtors to recover preference claims against creditors. As a general rule, payments made to creditors within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing date that are considered "preferential" can be recovered by the debtor. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 established that creditors seeking protection from preference claims had to cumulatively prove that the payment was made in the "ordinary course" of the debtor's business and that the payment terms were standard for the industry. Under the new law, to avoid a preference claim, creditors need only to prove that one of such conditions holds.
Section 1114 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was also amended by the new code. Such section is essential as it governs the modification of "Other PostEmployment Benefit" plans for retirees, including those that provide health coverage and life insurance. As mentioned in table 1, the BAPCPA now requires the bankruptcy court to undo any modification to retiree benefits made within 180 days before the Chapter 11 date, if the company was insolvent at the time of the modification. This change benefits present and future company' retirees as it prevents managers to engage in wealth-expropriation strategies that maximize shareholders' value at their expense, a common practice during the 1980's and early 1990s. Finally, the new bankruptcy law is much tougher on firms that repeatedly seek Federal Protection. In effect, with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, firms could file for relief frequently without suffering any penalization. Currently, however, the bankruptcy code specifies that, unless the court grants an extension, the automatic stay is lifted in 30 days in the case of companies filing for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 less than one year after reorganizing in Chapter 11.
Market reaction to bankruptcy announcements and research hypothesis
The literature unanimously shows that the announcement of bankruptcy leads to important losses in shareholder value. For instance, Aharony et al (1980) and Clark and Weinstein (1983) find that the market price of firms filing for bankruptcy under the Chandler Act plunges long before the actual event date. Morse and Shaw (1988) report very similar results when examining a small sample of firms filing for Chapter 11 after the introduction of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. In a subsequent paper, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) find that shareholders, unsecured debtholders and convertible debtholders lose most of their value around the bankruptcy announcement date while secured debtholders are largely unaffected by such announcement. Recently, Dawkins et al (2007) and Coelho et al (2010) re-examine the market reaction to bankruptcy announcements. Dawkins et al (2007) show that prices tend to reverse after the bankruptcy date, while Coelho et al (2010) document a post-bankruptcy drift of at least -28% over the 12 months following the formal announcement of Chapter 11.
The extant literature clearly suggests that the announcement of bankruptcy is perceived by the market as a very clear bad news event that drives prices to plummet before, at and after the formal bankruptcy date. To what extent did this perception change after the enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Code? This is the central question I explore in this paper. As discussed in section 2, some of the modifications introduced by the BAPCPA are likely to impair distressed firms' ability to successfully emerge from Chapter 11 as a going concern. For instance, the shorter exclusivity period substantially reduces the debtor's bargaining power, and may lead companies to simply sell their assets rather than attempt a more time-consuming (and difficult) reorganization (Altman et al, 2009 ). In addition, asset sales and other corporate transactions are also more likely to occur if termination of debtor exclusivity results in more, and competing plans being proposed by creditors and hedge funds, who would rather "cash out" than reorganize (Gilson, 2010) . Liquidity is also an issue with the new bankruptcy code, as it forces firms to have significantly more cash at hand right at the beginning of the case than that required by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Gottlieb et al, 2009 ). Indeed, bankrupt firms now need more cash to secure utility services and liabilities associated with their pension funds. More cash is also required to cure potential pre-bankruptcy defaults on leases and to deal effectively with the more generous reclamation rights granted by the BAPCPA. These changes make the new bankruptcy law tougher on bankrupt companies and thus we should expect to observe an even more negative market reaction when firms file for Chapter 11 after the enactment of the new bankruptcy code. This leads to the key research hypothesis that I explore in this paper: 6 I combine all cases in a single list and remove duplicates, which yields a total of 2,474 firmyears. Firms are then located on CRSP and Compustat. A total of 474 companies had to be eliminated since they could not be found in at least one of these databases. Next, I remove the 82 firms that do not trade common stock on a major U.S. stock exchange prior to their bankruptcy filing date. In addition, I eliminate the 1,518 firms that are delisted prior to their bankruptcy date or that do not trade for at least two full weeks on a major U.S. exchange after filing for bankruptcy. From the 459 surviving firms, I remove 18 companies operating in the financial or utility sectors 7 and also delete 38 firms with insufficient data on Compustat. Finally, in the last step, I remove two firms incorporated outside the U.S. and two firms filing for Chapter 7. 
Data

Methodology
To assess the stock price performance of my sample firms both before and after the formal announcement of Chapter 11 I compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) (Clark and Weinstein, 1983; Morse and Shaw, 1988; Dawkins et al, 2007 Finally, each sample firm is allocated to a particular portfolio based on its Chapter 11 filing date. Firms filing for Chapter 11 before 10/12/2005 are allocated to the "Pre-BAPCPA" portfolio; the remaining companies are included in the "Post-BAPCPA" portfolio. The stock price performance of these two portfolios is compared using both a t-test and a Mann-Whitney test over different event periods.
Results
This section is divided in two parts. The first presents some descriptive statistics of my sample firms. The second summarizes the results of my event-study.
Descriptive statistics
I start analyzing the differences between the two portfolios of sample firms with the help of table 3. Panel A summarizes some key accounting variables. As can be seen, pre-and post-BACPCA bankrupt firms share similar size (median total assets of around $1,000m), leverage (median total debt/total assets ratio of around 48%) and (poor) economic performance (mean and median ROA is negative for both groups). There is also evidence that the firms under analysis are severely financially distressed before formally seeking relief from creditors. The mean z-score for the pre-BAPCPA (post-BAPCPA) group is 1.31 (0.84), with Altman (1968) establishing a cut-off point of 1.81 to separate firms that clearly fall into the bankruptcy category from all other firms.
Panel B of table 3 summarizes some market-related variables. It shows that firms in the pre-and post-BAPCPA portfolios share similar market capitalization and book-to-market ratio before filing for Chapter 11.10 However, firms filing for Chapter 11 after October 2005 seem to lose a higher share of market value (in unadjusted terms) in the one year-period that precedes the bankruptcy announcement month and have lower market price than their pre-BAPCPA counterparts. Interestingly, panel B of table 3 also shows that firms in the post-BAPCPA portfolio are more heavily traded in the one-year period leading up to the bankruptcy announcement day and have lower transaction costs than their pre-BAPCPA equivalents. Table 4 summarizes the results of my event study. Panel A shows what happens before the actual bankruptcy date. For the 12-month pre-event window, the mean (median) CAR for the pre-and post-BAPCPA portfolios is -75% (-88%) and -90% (-97%) respectively. Parallel figures for the 6-month period are -55% (-61%) and -52% (-43%). The t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are not statistically significant, indicating that the loss in shareholder value is similar either if the bankruptcy case is initiated under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 or the BAPCPA.
Market reaction to Chapter 11 announcements: evidence from the pre-and post-BAPCPA periods
Panel B of table 4 summarizes the risk-adjusted stock price performance around the bankruptcy date. As can be seen, the market's short-term anticipation to the announcement of Chapter 11 does not seem to depend on whether the case is initiated before or after October 2005. In effect, the t-test and the WilcoxonMann-Whitney test are not significant for both the (-10,-6) and (-5,-1) eventwindows. In addition, panel B of table 4 shows that the market reacts very negatively to the announcement of bankruptcy in both the pre-and post-BAPCPA periods. In particular, the mean (median) CAR for the pre-BAPCPA portfolio in the (-1,+1) window is -26%, significant at the 1% level (-24%, p<0.01) and the respective counterpart values for the post-BAPCPA portfolio are -44% (p<0.01) and -44% (p<0. 01). However, the t-test and the Wilcoxon-MannWhitney test are now statistically significant, suggesting that, from the market's perspective, filing for Chapter 11 under the BAPCPA is worst than doing so under the previous bankruptcy law. Finally, panel B of table 4 shows that the market's response to the announcement of Chapter 11 critically depends on the code that will be used to govern the resolution of the case. Market prices suffer a rebound in the one-week period following the formal announcement of Chapter 11when cases are initiated under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: indeed, the mean (median) CAR for the (+2,+5) interval is +8% (p<0.01) (+2%; p=0.012). In sharp contrast, prices plunge over the same period after the passing of the BAPCPA: the mean CAR is now -7% (p=0.059) and the median CAR is -23% (p=0.027). Importantly, the t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are Table 4 here statistically significant at normal levels. The additional (+6,+10) event-period yields similar results.
Robustness tests
In this section, I change my initial event-study in an attempt to confirm that my results are not a mere statistical artifact.
Panel B of table 3 shows that, for both the pre-and post-BAPCPA portfolios, stock prices fall sharply in the pre-Chapter 11 period. As such, it could be possible that my findings are explained simply as the continuation of such negative returns as illustrated by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . To test whether stock momentum is, in fact, driving my results I match each of my bankrupt firms with a control firm as follows (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Ang and Zhang, 2004) . For each sample firm, market capitalization is measured one month before the bankruptcy filing date.
11 CRSP is then searched for an initial pool of matching candidates with market capitalization one month before the bankruptcy filing date of 70% to 130% of the sample firm's equity value. Each control firm is then identified as that firm within this set with the closest momentum to that of the sample firm. For both sample and control firms, momentum is computed as follows: R is the raw monthly return of firm i in month t and 0 t = is the bankruptcy announcement month. All data for computing momentum are taken from CRSP's monthly stock return file.
Panel A of table 5 summarizes my results. In the one year pre-event period, all of the computed CARs are negative and significant at the 1% level and the test for differences in mean and median performance is not significant at normal levels. Panel A of table 5 also shows that, shortly before the bankruptcy announcement date, the market does not discern between firms filing for Chapter 11 under the new or the old bankruptcy law. In addition, in line with the results reported in section 6, there is evidence that the market perceives the announcement of Chapter 11 very differently depending on whether or not the BAPCPA is enacted at the time of the filing. For the pre-BAPCPA portfolio, the mean (median) (-1,+1) CAR is -28% (-25%), significant at better than the 1% (1%) level. The corresponding pre-BAPCPA mean and median CARs are -43% (p<0.01) and -47% (p<0.01), respectively. The difference in performance is again statistically significant. Finally, panel A of table 5 shows that, in the subsequent days to the formal announcement of bankruptcy, the drop in market price is much sharper when firms file for Chapter 11 under the BAPCPA. In effect, the mean and median size and momentum risk-adjusted stock price performance of such firms is negative and statistically significant both for the (+2,+5) and (+6,+10) windows; importantly, the same does not hold for the pre-BAPCPA firms as most of the computed CARs are positive or not significant at normal levels. In a nutshell, the results reported on panel A of table 5 are very consistent with those of section 6.2. Hence, I cannot explain my findings in terms of prior return continuation.
Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilayi (2008) among others show that firms in an advanced state of finance distress and with low book-to-market ratios, earn comparably low subsequent returns. It is therefore important to verify whether results are a manifestation of such effect or not. To test this hypothesis, I define a new set of control firms as follows. First, I identify all non-bankrupt, non-finance, non-utility firms with a market capitalization between 70% and 130% of that of each my sample firm's market capitalization. Second, from this set, I choose the firm with closest book-to-market ratio to that of the sample firm.
Panel B of table 5 summarizes my results. It shows that prior to the bankruptcy date, the market does not distinguish between firms seeking relief under the BAPCPA or the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Moreover, there is evidence of an increase in the negative reaction to the announcement of Chapter 11 both at the event date and subsequent few days when the new bankruptcy code is in place. These results are in line with the findings reported above and indicate that my main conclusion is not driven by a pre-event financial distress effect.
Conclusion
This paper compares how the market reacts to the announcement of Chapter 11 under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the BAPCPA. Prior to the actual Chapter 11 date, the risk-adjusted stock price performance of firms filing under both codes is quite similar. However, after the enactment of the BAPCPA the market reaction to formal bankruptcy hardened considerably. Indeed, the riskadjusted loss in shareholders' value more than doubles in comparison with that Table 5 here in the previous period. Moreover, prices continue to fall very significantly in the few days following the formal announcement of bankruptcy; the same does not occur for cases initiated under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
My findings highlight the close connection that exists between regulation and market behavior and provide support to those claiming that the introduction of the new bankruptcy code has made it more difficult for firms to successfully reorganize in Chapter 11. My results are also important for investors and corporate executives. The former should recognize that trading the stock of bankrupt firms is now more damaging for shareholder wealth than ever before; the latter should realize that filing for Chapter 11 can no longer be used as another management tool as in a not so distant past. Debtor had the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan during the first 120 days of the case (and an additional 60 days to get the plan approved).
Extensions of the debtor's exclusivity period could be granted by the courts, which regularly occurred in larger cases.
Debtor has exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan for 18 months after the date of the bankruptcy filing (and an additional 2 months to get the plan approved), after which exclusivity is terminated. The court is not permitted to grant extensions. "Chapter 22s"
[Amended Section 362(c)]
Companies that reorganized in Chapter 11 could later re-file for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 without penalty.
If a company files for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 within one year of exiting Chapter 11, the automatic stay will expire in 30 days (unless the court grants an extension).
Treatment of Trade VendorsReclamation Rights [Amended Section 546(c)]
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a vendor is entitled to reclaim merchandise shipped to a customer on credit if the shipment is made while the customer is "insolvent." The vendor has to assert its reclamation right within 10 days of the shipment date. If the customer filed for Chapter 11, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code preserved the vendor's reclamation right, and extended the 10-day window to 20 days.
Vendors' reclamation rights in bankruptcy are preserved, but now vendors can reclaim merchandise up to 45 days after the shipment date (or, if the 45 day period ends after the customer files for Chapter 11, up to 20 days after the bankruptcy filing). Payments made to creditors within 90 days of a bankruptcy filing that were deemed to be "preferential" could be recovered by the debtor. The window expanded to one year for transfers made to "insiders."
To defend against a preference action, a creditor had to show two things: (1) the payment was made in the "ordinary course" of the debtor's business, and (2) the payment was made on terms that were standard for the industry.
Transfers of less than $5,000 are no longer avoidable as preferences; actions to recover transfers of less than $10,000 must now be filed in the defendant's home jurisdiction.
Creditors only to prove condition (1) or condition (2).
Employee Retirement Benefits [Amended Section 1114] N.A. The bankruptcy court must undo any modification to retiree benefits made within 180 days before a company files for Chapter 11, if the company was insolvent at the time of the modification (unless the modification of retiree benefits is consistent with "the balance of equities"). SIZE: market capitalization (price times shares outstanding), in millions of dollars. BOOK/MARKET: book-to-market ratio. MOMENTUM: average value of the 12-month raw returns preceding the bankruptcy announcement month. PRICE: daily average stock price computed over the 12-month period preceding the bankruptcy filing month (in dollars). VOLUME: average daily trading volume (volume/shares outstanding) computed over the 12-month period preceding the bankruptcy announcement month. QUOTED: quoted bid-ask spread for the 12-month period preceding the bankruptcy announcement month, computed as in Stoll and Whaley (1983) . 
